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2003-2004 SUPREME COURT TERM:
ANOTHER LOSING SEASON FOR THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Professor Joel M Goral
Today I will discuss the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence for the past Term. When I spoke last year, and
reported on the Term, the score was zero wins, five losses for First
Amendment claimants in the Supreme Court; not a good year if
you support the First Amendment.' This year there were four
cases and in only one of them did the First Amendment prevail.
Two cases involved freedom of speech; two cases involved
freedom of religion.'
Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Pomona
College; LL.B., Columbia University School of Law. This article is based on a
transcript of remarks from the Sixteenth Annual Supreme Court Review
Program presented at Touro Law Center, Huntington, New York.
2 See Joel Gora, First Amendment Decisions - 2002 Term, 20 TOURO L. REV.
251 (2004) (discussing the United States Supreme Court's First Amendment
cases firom the 2002-2003 term).
3 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2004) (holding that the Child
Online Protection Act was overbroad and violated the First Amendment).
'See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (upholding
Titles I and I1 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 as not violating
the First Amendment); Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2788 (holding that the Child
Online Protection Act was overbroad and violated the First Amendment); Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2312 (2004) (holding that
Newdow had no standing to challenge the school district's policy of reciting the
Pledge of Allegiance in the classroom and therefore, never reaching the issue of
whether use of the phrase "one Nation under God" violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725
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A. Free Speech and the Internet
Let us begin with Ashcroft v. ACLU. This was the free
speech high point, if you will, of the term. Namely, this was the
one and only case where free speech interests prevailed, albeit by a
narrow five-to-four majority. This case was the third installment
in the government's never-ending war against smut on the Internet.
The first installment was a case called Reno v. ACLU. 6
Janet Reno was the Attorney General during the Clinton
Administration. The case involved challenges to the
Communications Decency Act, which was Congress' first effort to
regulate sexual material on the Internet.7 The Court majority in the
case struck down the key feature of the Communications Decency
Act, the control of sexual material available to minors, on the
grounds that it was vague and overbroad.8
Congress went back to the drawing board and crafted the
Child Online Protection Act.9 The Act tried to narrow the scope of
regulation and tried to focus more on materials that would be
harmful to minors rather than simply available to minors. It tried
to define the scope of the Act in a way that was somewhat parallel
to the definition of grown-up obscenity - appeals to prurient
interests, lack of redeeming value, use of community standards,
(2004) (holding that the "denial of funding for vocational religious instruction
alone" does not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
' 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004).
6 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
7 Id at 849.
I d. at 879.




That case, Ashcroft v. ACLU, went up to the Supreme Court
about two years ago. " The issue was the validity of the
community standards requirements because the statute said the
material was prohibited if it failed these tests with regard to
community standards. 2 That caused a big discussion within the
Court about which community standard applied - national, state,
local communities where the material was received, or a theoretical
community standard. The Court felt that the use of a community
standard, while permissible, had to be defined more specifically
than it was in the statute and sent the case back for yet another
tuM.13
This Term, the Court dealt with the return of Ashcroft v.
ACLU. Again the question was to what extent adult material can
be restricted on the Internet in order to protect the interests of
minors. 4 Here the Court let technology be the First Amendment
guide because everyone agreed that trying to restrict Internet
access to sexual material by minors was a compelling state interest.
The question was whether this law, which basically made it a
felony to put out material that could be made available, or was
harmful to minors, was a fair and effective way to achieve that
compelling objective, or were there other ways less restrictive of
'0 § 231 (e)(6).
" 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
12 Id. at 566; § 231 (e)(6)(A).
13 ACLU, 535 U.S. at 586.
14 Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2788.
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First Amendment rights. 5
The majority of the Court said that the availability of
blocking software that parents could install on their home
computer, which would block out any material that had certain
words in it or certain images on it, was a less restrictive alternative
to criminal punishment. 6 The law basically provided for criminal
punishment of anybody who, for commercial purposes, knowingly
posted material that was harmful to minors. 7 It allowed for a
defense if the person could show that he or she had tried to see
whether the users were minors or not, particularly by requiring
credit cards and other identification online, so there would be some
restriction on getting the material." But what that meant was that
the communicators of this material would have to ask everybody
for a credit card or identification in order to permit them access to
sexually-oriented material; and that would, of course, have a
chilling effect on grown-ups who might not want to give their
credit card or identification, particularly if they were using a
computer at work to access Playboy.corn or something like that.
So the concern was that this defense was not really a genuine
defense that would enable people to avoid the statute in a
meaningful way. Accordingly, the majority focused on
technology: the fact that parents could install the blocking software
on their own computers would achieve the congressional goal with
15 Id.
16 Id. at 2792.
17 Id. at 2789; § 23 1(e)(2).
"s Id. at 2789.
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a less restrictive impact on the First Amendment.
The Court noted that not only was use of the blocking
software less restrictive on First Amendment rights, but also that it
was more restrictive in terms of allowing minors access to adult
material. 9 A clever teenager with a credit card could get the
material under the statute, but now that parents can use the
software, the child cannot get the material at all. So, the Court was
excited in some respects about the censorship potential of this
blocking software.
The Court also pointed out the statute's limitation in only
restricting materials that originated within the United States
whereas blocking software is global; you can restrict material that
comes from anywhere. 0 So broad censorship operates under a
different theory when it is censorship achieved by' the parents. It is
the private choice by the parents rather than the public dictate of
the state and Congress. Therefore, the majority felt that was the
better rationale for finding that Congress was pursuing a valid,
compelling objective, but there were less restrictive alternatives
available to do so.2'
There was a concurring opinion from the liberal
perspective. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, normally a strong First
'. Ashcrof. 124 S. Ct. at 2792.
20 Id.
2' Id. at 2793. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002)
(holding that a ban on virtual child pornography was unconstitutionally broad):
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group. Inc.. 529 U.S. 803. 827 (2000) (holding
that the government did not meet its burden of showin2 the least restrictive




Amendment partisan, wrote the Court's opinion. A concurring
opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens and joined by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsberg took an even more speech-friendly position.
It questioned whether criminal penalties were appropriate at all and
reasoned that Congress could have achieved its goal using less
drastic remedial measures given that it was dealing with
restrictions on speech.22
One of the most significant things about the opinion was
that the majority seemed to assume that the material with sexual
content was sufficiently protected by the First Amendment so that
a strict scrutiny standard would apply to judge governmental
efforts to restrict that material. 23 That was the first time the Court
appeared to apply a strict standard to material dealing with sexual
content. As a result of applying that strict standard, the Court put
the burden of persuasion clearly on the shoulders of the
government to justify not only that a compelling interest supported
restricting the material, but also that proposed alternatives would
not be as effective as the statute. 4 It is an important case for those
who have a specific interest in this area, but it is also important in
general as a First Amendment case recognizing broad protection
for speech with sexual content.
22 Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2796 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Criminal prosecutions
are, in my view, an inappropriate means to regulate the universe of materials
classified as 'obscene,' since 'the line between communications which 'offend' and
those which do not is too blurred to identify criminal conduct.' ") (quoting Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).




There was a dissenting opinion written by Justice Stephen
G. Breyer.25 Justice Breyer, having been a senior staff official of
Congress before he became a judge and perhaps more sympathetic
to the congressional work product than the other Justices, felt that
the burden of the statute on free expression was modest given the
importance of protecting children against access to the sexual
materials online.26 He stated that the requirement of having to
supply identification or a credit card in order to gain access to this
material was not so burdensome that it should serve as the
justification for striking down the statute.27  Also, he felt the
congressional act was one of reasonable balance with the children
and families on the one hand, and the speech and interests of
people who communicated sexual materials on the other hand. 8
Justice Antonin Scalia also dissented on the grounds that strict
scrutiny was not at all appropriate for a case dealing with
commercialized pornography.29 In his mind, this material was not
a value protected by the First Amendment and the government had
broader regulatory powers over it.3"
So the Court struck down the statute as violating the First
Amendment, but the question remains: what type of regulation is
permissible to deal with material containing sexual content on the
25 Id. at 2797 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 2798 (refusing to accept the majority's "conclusion that Congress could
have accomplished its statutory objective ... in other, less restrictive ways").
27 Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2800-01 (Breyer, J., dissenting).281 d at 2803.




Internet? 3 ' As I said, this is Congress' second strike at it. It may
try a third time and maybe three strikes and you are out, and we
will have to accept the fact that the easiest way to prevent minors
from seeing material on the Internet is to simply turn off your
computer. In any event, it was a high point for the First
Amendment, especially considering that the Court found strong
First Amendment protection for sexually-oriented material.
B. Separation of Church and State
The second case I want to discuss is one of two religion
cases. This case, Locke v. Davey,32 involved a state prohibition on
the use of state-supplied educational funds to pursue education
leading to a career in the ministry.3 Washington State, like many
other states, provides scholarships and other subsidies to college
students, but students studying for the ministry are excluded from
that benefit.34 There was a movement at the end of the Nineteenth
Century to put restrictions of this kind in state constitutions to
avoid excessive governmental support of religious doctrines. 5
Washington's restriction on using public funds for religious
education was part of that tradition.
31 Id. at 2795 (stating "[o]n a final point, it is important to note that this opinion
does not hold that Congress is incapable of enacting any regulation of the
Internet designed to prevent minors from gaining access to harmful materials.").
32 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
33 1d. at 715.
34 Id.
35 ld. at 723.
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A fellow who wanted to attend college to become a
minister challenged the law. 6 Had he studied any other subject or
leaned towards any other profession, these educational funds
would have been available to him.37 But by choosing to study for
the ministry, those funds were denied. He challenged the
restriction on the ground that it violated his rights to free exercise
of religion. 9
The First Amendment protects religion in two ways. The
first part of the First Amendment says, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."4 These two clauses, the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause, are two sides of the coin of
separation between church and state. The idea is the Establishment
Clause prohibits the government from supporting religion, and the
Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from punishing or
burdening religion. The question is: if something is permitted by
the Establishment Clause, that is, if the government can support
religion in a certain way without violating the clause, is it required
to do so in order not to violate the Free Exercise Clause? That
basically is what Mr. Davey argued since the Court had previously
held it was permissible for states to make educational funding
available for people studying to be ministers if the state decides to;
36Id. at 718.
37 Locke, 540 U.S. at 717.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 718.
40 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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such funding does not violate the Establishment Clause." He
argued, therefore, one has a right under the Free Exercise Clause
not to be excluded from such benefits.42 Since the state could give
funds to a person without violating the Establishment Clause,
funds had to be given to a person studying theology or else the
restriction violated the Free Exercise Clause.43 Had the Court
accepted that argument, it would have had a very powerful
consequence. Take for example the whole school voucher
movement4 and any other situation where the government makes
funds available to educational activities generally. Since the
government could make the funds available to the religious activity
without violating the Establishment Clause, would a government
be required to make them available to a religious activity in order
to avoid violating the Free Exercise Clause?
In a seven-to-two decision written by Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist, the Court said the answer was no.45 It said there is a
41 Locke, 540 U.S. at 719 (stating that states may make funds available to
individuals pursuing degrees in devotional theology) (citing Witters v. Wash.
Dep't Servs., 474 U.S. 481 (1986)).
42 Id. (stating that it would be constitutional to give money to Promise Scholars
who pursue a degree in devotional theology, but the question presented to the
Court was whether Washington State was obligated to do so in accordance with
its own constitution).
41 Id. at 720-21.
44 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). This decision upheld
Ohio's pilot program that allowed parents residing in the Cleveland school
district to decide which school, public or private, they wanted their children to
attend by providing money to parents who chose to send their children to private
school. The pilot program was enacted in response to the failing education
system in the Cleveland school district area. The Supreme Court held that the
pilot program did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id at 643-44.
" Locke, 540 U.S at 725.
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gap between what is permitted by the Establishment Clause and
what is required by the Free Exercise Clause.46 So, just because it
would be allowable for a state to support studying to be a minister
does not mean the state is required to support being a minister.47
The exclusion of a religious calling or education for that calling
from otherwise generally available public funds did not violate Mr.
Davey's free exercise of religion.48
Davey also argued that the prohibition on funding
education looking towards a career in religion was a product of
animus towards religion. 49  The argument invoked a
twelve-year-old Supreme Court case where state law disallowed
the practice of the Santeria religion by specifically targeting it." In
that case, the Court said the law was not neutral, that it was based
on animus towards a specific religion and it violated the right to
free exercise of religion." Davey claimed the same thing was true




49 Id. at 720.
50 Locke, 540 U.S. at 720 (refusing to extend the Court's holding in Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) to the facts of Locke).
5' Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542. The Court stated:
The ordinances by their own terms target [the Santeria
religion]; the texts of the ordinances were gerrymandered with
care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude
almost all secular killings; and the ordinances suppress much
more religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve
the legitimate ends asserted in their defense.
Id.
52 Locke, 540 U.S. at 720. (stating Davey's argument as a contention that "under
the rule . . . enunciated in [Lukumi], the program is presumptively
unconstitutional because it is not facially neutral with respect to religion.").
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this was a law which denied a subsidy." Although the government
could grant the funds if it wanted to, the government was
privileged to withhold them if it chose to and the withholding did
not violate the First Amendment. 4 Thus, it was a seven-to-two
decision rejecting the free exercise claim and finding a gap
between what the Establishment Clause allows and what the Free
Exercise Clause requires.
There was a dissent written by Justice Antonin Scalia and
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Their point of view was that
the restriction demonstrated hostility and animus toward religion; it
came out of a century-old tradition where states put provisions like
this in their state constitutions because they did not want to fund
religious education, specifically targeting certain religions and
their educational activities, and the Court should recognize what
was going on here and treat it accordingly.5 But the majority
found that the government was not required by the Free Exercise
Clause to include religious education of this kind within a general
education-funding program. 6 Had the Court granted the free
exercise claim and held that programs had to include religious
education, it would have had a real effect on compelling, or at least
53 Id. (distinguishing Locke from Lukumi and stating that the Promise
Scholarship Program imposed "neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type
of religious service or rite" but rather "[t]he State has merely chosen not to fund
a distinct category of instruction.").
54 Id. at 719 (stating "there is no doubt that the State could, consistent with the
Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional
theology").
55 Id. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating "[tihis case is about discrimination
against a religious minority.").
56 Id. at 725.
[Vol 20
FIRST AMENDMENT
strongly urging, governments to include religion in all of those
programs. Now the government has a little more room to perhaps
pick and choose.
C. "One Nation Under God"
The second religion case I want to discuss is Elk Grove
Unified School District v. Newdow, an Establishment Clause
case. 7 This is a case where somebody claimed that a government
practice impermissibly supported and therefore, established
religion." Most everyone is familiar with the Pledge of
Allegiance: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of
America and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under
God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."59 The "under
God" was challenged by the father of a young ten-year-old school
child." The father was apparently very bright and argued his own
case. He lost, but not on First Amendment grounds. Rather, the
Court held that he lacked standing to bring suit.6' It has been
suggested that the Court, over the years, has used lack of standing
"124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). Newdow and his daughter were atheists. He brought
an action against the school district arguing that the "group recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance" in the classroom violated the First Amendment because
"the Pledge contain[ed] the words 'under God.' "Id. at 2305.
58 Id. at 2305.
59 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2002).
6o Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2305.
61 Id. at 2312. The Court dismissed the case due to Newdow's lack of standing
"to sue as next friend" for his daughter. Id.
2005]
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to avoid deciding tough cases.62
Most of the cases dealing with religious activity in the
public schools have rejected the idea and found the public schools
- grammar schools, intermediate schools, and high schools - are
not a place for religious activity, with some exceptions.63  If you
look at the cases going back thirty or thirty-five years, banning
school prayer and things like that, most of the decisions are against
allowing religion in school.64 This decision would have been a
close case, I think, if the Court had to decide it on the merits. But
the claim that "under God" constitutes an impermissible
establishment of religion was turned aside on standing grounds.65
62 Id. at 23 12-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (stating that in the past the Court
"judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction").
63 Compare Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000)
(holding that a school district violated the Establishment Clause by "permitting
student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games"), and Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992) (holding that a principal who "decided that an
invocation and a benediction should be given" by a rabbi at a secondary public
school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause), and Doe v.
Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 274, 279, 295 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing
the district court's ruling and holding that the school district's Clergy in the
Schools program violated the Establishment Clause because only Clergy
members were invited to participate); with Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001) (holding that the school district violated the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment when the superintendent "denied the
Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that
the Club was religious in nature").
64 See Santa Fe Indep. Seh. Dist., 530 U.S. at 301 (holding that student led
prayers at public school football games violated the Establishment Clause); Lee,
505 U.S. at 586-87 (holding that an invocation and benediction delivered by a
rabbi at a public school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment
Clause); Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999). The
court held the "Cleveland Board of Education's practice of opening its meetings
with a prayer" violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 371. The court reasoned
that this kind of practice "conveys the message of government endorsement of
religion in the public school system." Id. at 386.
65 Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2312.
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Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence"
that was joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and joined in part
by Justice Clarence Thomas; Justice O'Connor also wrote a
separate concurrence as did Justice Thomas. Two of them took the
position that "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance was part of a
patriotic ceremony, not a religious activity; it was not
governmental endorsement of religion, it was not governmental
preference of any one religion.67 It was an acknowledgment of the
fact that the framers of the Constitution, the fathers and mothers of
the country, were religious people and it is no different from
having '"In God We Trust" on the dollar bills in your wallet. 6 It is
an amenity, a ceremony. A third Justice, Justice Thomas, wanted
to revisit the entire jurisprudence of freedom of religion under the
Fourteenth Amendment.69 It is his view that the First Amendment,
which has been incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, says
Congress shall not establish religion.7" It does not say the local
school board cannot. So there is a little bit of a disconnection, he
feels, between the restrictions on Congress enacting something and
the restrictions on the local school board enacting something where
religion is involved.7 Of course, "under God" was enacted by
Congress.72 So there are three Justices who think "under God" is
66 Id. at 2312 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
67 Id. at 2319-20; Id. at 2323 (O'Connor, ., concurring).
681 Id. at 2318 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
69 Id. at 2331 (Thomas, J., concurring).
70 Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2331 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71 id.
72 Id. at 2306 (citing 4 U.S.C. § 4).
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not a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Justice Scalia, who probably would agree with that, recused
himself from this case because at some legal conference before the
case was heard, he expressed the opinion that, of course, "under
God" is okay, but then had the good sense not to participate in the
case and decide that issue. 3 So there are four Justices who seem to
be kindly disposed towards keeping "God" in the Pledge. The
matter might be academic except, of course, for the Ten
Commandments.
There was a Supreme Court decision in 1980, Stone v.
Graham, where, in a two-page per curiam opinion, the Court
summarily ruled that the posting of the Ten Commandments in a
public school lobby violated the Establishment Clause.74 It said
that it is too much of an introduction of religion into government
and into schools,75 and that precedent stood for a while.
As some of you may have noted, earlier this week the
Supreme Court granted review to two Ten Commandment cases.
The cases involved a public display of the Ten Commandments,
which is a hot issue all over the country; and there were two
conflicting federal circuit court decisions. One decision said that
13 See Linda Greenhouse, Atheist Presents Case for Taking God From Pledge,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at Al.
" 449 U.S. 39 (1980). This case involved a Kentucky statute that required the
posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public school
classroom. Even though the copies were purchased with private funds, the
Supreme Court held that the statute violated the first prong of the Lemon test
because the posting of the Commandments served no secular purpose. Id. at 42.
75 Id. at 42.
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the practice was acceptable; 6 the other said that the practice was
improper governmental support of religion.7" Sometime between
now and next Touro conference, the Supreme Court will
presumably have to decide whether the Ten Commandments,
which is arguably secular and a part of history, can appear in
governmental public places without violating the Establishment
Clause or whether the Ten Commandments are so sectarian and
focused on certain Judeo-Christian religious traditions that having
them in a public place sponsored by the government violates the
Establishment Clause.
D. Campaign Finance and the First Amendment
The last case I want to discuss is the campaign finance
case. If you read the party caption of McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission"8 closely, you will see that the American
Civil Liberties Union was one of the nonprofit, nonpartisan
organizations that was challenging the campaign finance law as
plaintiffs. And in the interest of full disclosure, I should state that I
was one of the ACLU's lawyers in the case.
76 Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
346 (2005). The circuit court found that Texas' display of the Ten
Commandments, located between the Texas Supreme Court and Capitol
Buildings, did not violate the First Amendment. The court was not persuaded
that a reasonable viewer, touring the capital, would believe the government was
endorsing religion. Id. at 182.
77 ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125
S. Ct. 310 (2005). The circuit court held that framed copies of the Ten
Commandments in Kentucky's county courthouses and in certain Kentucky
schools violated the Establishment Clause because a reasonable observer could
find that Kentucky was endorsing religion. Id. at 460.
7 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
2005] 819
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This, of course, was a decision dealing with the
well-known McCain-Feingold campaign finance law, which had
been debated in Congress for several years in the late Nineties until
it was enacted in 2002 and signed by President Bush.79 Almost
two years later, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
upheld almost all the key features of the McCain-Feingold
campaign finance law.8" Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John
Paul Stevens co-authored the opinion for the Court.8 Justice
Stevens, of all the Justices, is the one that gives the least scrutiny
under the First Amendment to campaign finance regulations.82 In
fact, Justice Stevens said spending money on politics is just like
buying a business; it is economic activity, not political activity.13
He said from his point of view, the government can regulate
campaign funding the same way it regulates property, pretty much
at will.84 So you have a co-authored opinion, and one of the
Justices is the Court's leading opponent of First Amendment rights
'9 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
80 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114.
81 Id. Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion with respect
to Title I and II of BCRA, an act that contains a series of amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed
Titles III and IV of BCRA. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for Title VI.
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the opinion in its entirety. Id.
82 Id. at 135 (explaining that the treatment of contributions, though burdening
freedom of speech, was justified by the importance of preventing actual
corruption or even the perception of corruption that occurs in federal elections).
83 Id. at 147 (stating "[flor their part, lobbyists, CEO's, and wealthy individuals
alike all have candidly admitted donating substantial sums of soft money to
national committees not on ideological grounds, but for the express purpose of
securing influence over federal officials.").
84 Id at 137 (holding that Congress should be given deference in responding to
concerns about the integrity of the political process).
[Vol 20
FIRST AMENDMENT
in this area. Meanwhile, as you may recall, in some of the
significant five-to-four decisions in the last few years, such as
affirmative action and campaign finance, Justice O'Connor gave
direction to the Supreme Court." The position she takes is the
position the Court takes on so many of these controversial rulings.
So in this five-to-four ruling, the position she took was in
broad favor of the statute. She had signed on to a couple of
opinions previously that indicated skepticism about the
government regulating campaign funding, particularly regulations
on funding for independent groups, which was one of the main
features of the McCain-Feingold bill. 6 Nonetheless, she seemed to
have abandoned those misgivings or had a change of heart or
change of mind; perhaps she thought that since the political
process had produced the bipartisan bill and the Republican
president had signed it, maybe the Court owed the political system
an extra measure of deference. However it came out, Justice
Scalia said he was standing up for the First Amendment. 7
The Court essentially said where Congress is regulating the
funding of campaign speech, we have to give broad deference to
congressional regulations because Congress knows best about
8s See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that using race as a
factor in student admissions by the University of Michigan was constitutional);
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.
86 See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
518 U.S. 604 (1996) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits the
government from disallowing certain types of expenditures when the
expenditures are not coordinated with any candidate).
87 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating
that "[t]his is a sad day for the freedom of speech.").
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regulating elections.8 There is that old adage that war is too
important to be left to the generals. Well, maybe politics is too
important to be left to the politicians. And yet, what the Court said
was that when the politicians decide how to regulate the process by
which they get re-elected, we have to give them a great deal of
deference.89 Well, I think normal conflict of interest rules would
argue against giving them that deference.
In terms of what the Court said and did, there were two key
features of the law, and I would like to discuss those briefly. One
feature dealt with so-called "soft money" raising and spending by
political parties. Soft money was money that was not, until now,
regulated by federal campaign financing laws.9" That was money
that was used to support activities that did not relate directly to
electing a federal candidate.9' Parties would use the money for get-
out-the-vote drives, voter registration, party recruitment or issue
advocacy discussion, and for a wide range of things to help the
party that would not directly help the candidate.92 Because the
funding was not focused on federal elections directly, the law prior
to this Supreme Court decision was that parties could raise that
88 Id at 154 (stating that there was substantial evidence to support the
congressional need to regulate contributions made by individuals and
companies).
89 Id. at 137 (explaining that measures taken to protect the legitimacy of the
electoral process should not be presumed unconstitutional).
90 Id. at 123. "As a result, prior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law
permitted corporations and unions, as well as individuals ... to contribute ...
'soft-money' - to political parties for activities intended to influence state or
local elections." Id.
9' Id. at 122-23.
92 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 123.
[Vol 20
FIRST AMENDMENT
money from sources and in amounts that would be restricted if it
were going directly to help federal candidates.93 So that was called
soft money. Hard money was regulated money; soft money was
unregulated money that can be used for things not directly related
to federal campaigns. The McCain-Feingold bill essentially
outlawed soft money from federal politics.94 What that means is no
political party can raise any money except regulated money, hard
money. No state or local political party can spend any money that
has any impact on a federal election except hard, federally
regulated money.95
Those restrictions were attacked both on free speech
grounds and freedom of association grounds.96 The rights of
supporters to associate by supporting their parties financially, the
right of parties to use those funds to get their message out, all of
this was claimed as First Amendment activity. It was also a
restriction on state and local parties, who were also challenging the
federal limitations.9" This Court, for a while, was throwing out
federal laws that seemed to step on the toes of state and local
93 Id.
941d. at 161-62; 2 U.S.C. § 441i (a)(1) (2004), which states in part:
In general. A national committee of a political party (including
a national congressional campaign committee of a political
party) may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a
contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing
of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this
Act.
95 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 162.961d. at 138.
97 Id. at 158-59.
98 Id. at 161.
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interests safeguarded by the Tenth Amendment. Yet, the
federalists disappeared in this case. The Court gave trifling
responses to the argument that efforts to regulate local political
parties by Congress violated federalism. The Court said well, if it
has anything to do with federal elections, it is federal and Congress
can regulate it.99 As to the justification for the regulations, the
Court said there are special perquisites for large contributors to a
party."' But that is not corruption or even the appearance of
corruption, but the appearance of undue access or interest. The
Court says Congress is allowed to take that into account and to be
concerned about that when it writes those laws.'' In other words,
the Court said Congress has to have some room to maneuver in this
area.
Normally, the First Amendment speaker has to have room
to maneuver, but here the Court says Congress has to have that
right. It has to be allowed to enact prophylactic legislation so it
can target problems, but target them in ways to avoid or
circumvent the situation." 2 Well, that too seemed to be a strained,
impermissible justification in a First Amendment case. The First
Amendment requires the government to show compelling interests
and that no less restrictive alternatives are available to achieve
99 Id. at 187. "Congress has a fully legitimate interest in maintaining the
integrity of federal officeholders and preventing corruption of federal electoral
processes through the means it has chosen." Id.
"0 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 188 (stating "party affiliation is the primary way by
which voters . . . have special access to and relationships with federal
officeholders.").101 Id.
102 Id. at 170-71.
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those interests.' None of that was required by the Court of
Congress in this case to sustain the soft money restrictions on
political party raising and spending. Now, it almost seems a bit
like the Court flipped the burden of proof. In a First Amendment
case, the burden of proof is on the government to justify the law;
and in this case, it felt like the burden of proof was on the
challengers to undermine the law, which is normally the case with
economic regulations but not normally the case with First
Amendment regulations." 4 The soft money restrictions were
upheld top to bottom under the rationale just suggested.0 5
The other feature of the case was the part that did not
regulate political parties; it regulated independent groups like the
ACLU, the National Rifle Association, and the Sierra Club, as well
as corporations, and even individuals.0 6 Any group that put out
any message on the radio or television or cable within sixty days of
the general election, or within thirty days of the primary election
was subject to new restrictions on what were called "electioneering
communications," also known as free speech. 7
103 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(citing Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)).
'o' McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137. The Court stated "when reviewing Congress'
decision to enact contribution limits, 'there is no place for a strong presumption
against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the words strict
scrutiny.' " Id. (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400)
(2000)). Thus, the Court held that § 323 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 required a "less rigorous standard of review" than strict scrutiny. Id.
at 141.
'0' Id. at 224 (upholding "BCRA's two principal, complementary features: the
control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering communications.").
106 Id. at 187, 189 (stating that BCRA § 203 "restricts corporations' and labor
unions' funding of electioneering communications.").
10 7 Id. at 189.
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What are electioneering communications? 8 They are any
broadcast advertisements that refer to any person running for any
federal office. If you put out that advertisement, you are subject to
this new law regulating so-called electioneering communications.
If you are a corporation, it is a federal felony to put that
advertisement on television, whether you are a for-profit-
corporation, stock corporation, or even an ACLU nonprofit
membership corporation. Virtually every significant cause or
organization in America is a corporation, a nonprofit corporation.
This law drew no distinction between General Motors, a
multibillion-dollar conglomerate, and the ACLU or the AFL-CIO
and prohibiting their right to speak; they were barred from using
their own members' money to put out a message to President Bush
whether they were for or against certain issues."' The ACLU was
barred from putting out a message that the Patriot Act should not
be renewed if the message mentioned the President or for example,
New York Senators Shumer or Clinton if they were up for re-
election. So, if someone puts out an advertisement urging Senator
Clinton to vote against the Patriot Act renewal, or an advertisement
on television criticizing President Bush or urging Senator Shumer
to vote against the Act's renewal, the head of the ACLU goes to
los 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(I) (2004) states in pertinent part: "The term
'electioneering communication' means any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication which .. .refers to a cleariy identified candidate for Federal
office .... ").
'09 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190 (stating that § 203 of the BCRA "restricts
corporations' and labor unions' funding of electioneering communications.").
See 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (2000) (stating in pertinent part: "It is unlawful for any..
[Vol 20826
2005] FIRST AMENDMENT 827
jail for authorizing a broadcast advertisement by a corporation that
mentions the President of the United States during an election
season. In any event, the Court said this was not really a freedom
of speech case in terms of the message; this is a regulation of the
source of the message."' Since the source of the message is mostly
corporations and labor unions, Congress can regulate them
extensively even where free speech and legislation are concerned
and that was the justification."'
Congress was concerned that there were all these
advertisements on television;" 2 most of them criticized members of
. corporation... to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election to any political office . . ").
'0 Id. at 204. The Court held that "under BCRA, corporations and unions may
not use their general treasury funds to finance electioneering communications,
but they remain free to organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs
[political action committees], for that purpose. Because corporations can still
fund electioneering communications with PAC money, it is 'simply wrong' to
view the provision as a 'complete ban' on expression rather than a regulation."
Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm'n, v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003)).
"' Id. at 203. "Congress' power to prohibit corporations and unions from using
funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the
election or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in
our law." Id. The Court has "repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at 'the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.' " Id. at
205 (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
112 Id. at 207. The Court held that § 316(b)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign
Act is not underinclusive just because this provision "does not apply to
advertising in the print media or on the Internet." Id. The Court also explained
that:
records developed in this litigation and by the Senate
Committee adequately explain the reasons for this legislative
choice. Congress found that corporations and unions used soft
money to finance a virtual torrent of televised election-related
advertisements during the periods immediately preceding
federal elections, and that remedial legislation was needed to
stanch that flow of money.
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Congress and it has been suggested that was one of the reasons the
statute went sailing through. The Court said corporations, labor
unions, and even the nonprofits like the ACLU, which can be
regulated too, run most of these advertisements.' 13 The Court said,
given that no one is kept from speaking, because although you
cannot speak, you can form some other organization that can
speak, the right can therefore be exercised in some other way.'"
For those reasons, the Court sustained not only the soft money
regulation for political parties but also the so-called issue advocacy
regulations against independent groups and corporations, nonprofit
organizations and labor unions, and even individuals."' This is not
just about corporations and labor unions. The law also said anyone
who spends more than $10,000 in a year putting out a radio
advertisement that mentions, for example, Senator Shumer, is
regulated by the federal government as well." 6 And although you
are not prohibited from getting together with some of your friends
and putting out an advertisement praising or criticizing some
member of Congress, you have to follow the government's rules;
you have to disclose where you got that money from; you have to
Id.
"13 Id. at 203.
" McConnell, 540 U.S. at 188. "Congress is fully entitled to consider the real-
world differences between political parties and interest groups when crafting a
system of campaign finance regulation." Id. Furthermore, the Court opined "the
ability to form and administer separate segregated funds authorized by FECA §
316 ... has provided corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient
opportunity to engage in express advocacy." Id. at 203.
" id. at 224.
''
6 Id. at 194-95.
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provide all the details." 7
So it was not just a defeat for organized speech; it was also
a defeat for individual speech as well. The Court not only
approved these new, long-debated campaign finance restrictions on
parties and on idependent groups, but did so in a way unfriendly
to the First Amendment, which gives me concern for the future of
this and other First Amendment areas. So I will conclude by once
again reprising what Justice Scalia said because it was, to my
mind, a sad day for the First Amendment." 8
17 id.
"'8 Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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